I heard the term "brainstem reticular activating system" for the first time almost half a century ago. Although I remember that the brainstem reticular activating system refers to the location of conscious neurons, it has recently turned into a term that explains the generating mechanism for awakening. I think I understand. Even if conscious neurons are present, it cannot be seen whether there is one type or more and whether they are clustered in one place. As introduced in The Integration Theory of Psychoanalysis in the Next Generation, it is considered that there are many kinds of neural transmissions regarding conscious neurons. Therefore, it may be difficult to identify complicated neural transmissions one by one. However, no matter how complicated neural transmissions are, their reality will be later revealed as long as the principle of consciousness is understood. Do not be pessimistic. (The discussion about the location of consciousness is different from the discussion about the disturbance of consciousness).
Many people (including me) estimate that many conscious neurons present from the midbrain to the diencephalon. Recently, the number of elderly people is increasing, and I often examine patients with apoplexy. Even if they have sensory paralysis and motor paralysis, they are liable to have no problems in consciousness. Thus, it is clear that conscious neurons do not present in the cerebral hemisphere. However, when a patient develops epilepsy after apoplexy, the patient has a temporal disturbance of consciousness. Moreover, when a patient has angiopathy in the thalamus in the diencephalon, he or she has severe pain in the whole body with no damage to the body. In the case of epilepsy, an input (of displeasure) to consciousness might be intermittently impeded. In the case of thalamic pain, an input (of displeasure) to consciousness might continue to be excessive. In other words, given blocking neural transmissions from the emotional brain to conscious neurons and excessive inflow of pain stimulus from vicinity of the thalamusu, it brings us the conclusion that many conscious neurons present from the midbrain to the diencephalon. (The discussion about the location of consciousness is different from the discussion about the disturbance of consciousness).
I published The Integration Theory of Psychoanalysis in the Next Generation with a subtitle, "Consciousness is a navigator that goes through a detour to explore the main road." It is considered that there is a way to enable the selection of stimuli that are made effective via a detour, which are conscious neurons. At that time, information for collation should reach conscious neurons before choosing stimuli. This principle indicates retrograde convergence. In other words, retrograde convergence is like a ninja who hurries on a byway. When the work of this retrograde convergence is still poor, conscious neurons cannot work well for choice. With the advancement of memorizing and learning, retrograde convergence may develop quite well. The process of a navigator that goes through a detour (forestalling a main road) indicates conscious experiences. Therefore, it can be said that conscious experiences are detours or detour processes.
At first, there is a main road, "preconsciousness ⇔ unconsciousness," and subsequently there is a detour, "⇔ preconsciousness ⇔ consciousness ⇔ unconsciousness ⇔." Of course, a dream is a psychological phenomenon that is formed on a main road and disappears when a detour is generated. The most dramatic situation is the case where an individual attacked by someone in a dream is driven to wake. The difference between unconsciousness and consciousness is obvious. A dream does not have only the content of the displeasure-defense sytem. An individual sometimes has a dream in which the displeasure-regulation system is activated and has a refreshing wake. The main road, "preconsciousness ⇔ unconsciousness," mentioned above means a mixture of the displeasure-defense system and the displeasure-regulation system. In order to discriminate between them, consciousness draws preconsciousness to its side and deals with stimuli from unconsciousness. This is a primitive meaning of consciousness.
If there is "consciousness ⇔ unconsciousness," and there is a three-layer structure (topography), as Freud says, even if preconsciousness presents, the generating mechanism of consciousness, as I mentioned earlier, cannot be discovered. Then, other characteristics should be found, and it is easy to find an outstanding size of action potential in the brain. What action occurs there? It is most likely that the action indicates a dream. The action potential of a dream is outstandingly large from all around and presents almost the same appearance as the action potential in the brain during awakening. In other words, it may be observed that the action has "uniformity" and "individualization," unlike other surrounding action, and there is a possibility that its observation is interpreted to be consciousness. This may not be unnatural. Does the aggregate of brain action really represent consciousness? No matter how much the waveform of a dream resembles the one of consciousness, there is a possibility of a counterfeit. Therefore, it is doubtful whether it is appropriate to simply view the sum of electrical activity of neurons with uniformity and individualization as consciousness.
Patients with schizophrenia have clear consciousness. However, their information is not integrated. Their mental state that runs about in confusion by confusing information is represented in their conversation. Nevertheless, their consciousness is clear. A patient is asked a question by a real voice and is almost simultaneously asked another question through auditory hallucination. Then, a patient cannot understand the question that he/she must answer. It is repeatedly mentioned that their consciousness is still clear. In such a situation, can consciousness be regarded as an integrated organization? I think this would be unreasonable because, as I have already defined, consciousness is a detour process using retrograde convergence, I do not raise the question of what and how consciousness integrates. Moreover, when researchers suggest that a dream is also integrated consciousness, I object to their suggestion and argue that the root of their study is problematic.
In "new" topography, consciousness has an interaction with preconsciousness and unconsciousness, expressed as "preconsciousness ⇔ consciousness ⇔ unconsciousness." Here, I will introduce the dynamic phase, "preconsciousness → consciousness ← unconsciousness." If preconsciousness does not present and there is the dynamic phase, "unconsciousness → consciousness ← unconsciousness," because input from unconsciousness to consciousness is originally unpredictable, unpredictable information suddenly intrudes into consciousness from bidirectional unconsciousness and consciousness experiences a psychological situation as if being attacked by enemies on both sides. Of course, in such a situation, consciousness cannot exhibit its original function (understanding, judgement, differentiation, and vectorization). Although there is nothing for input from unconsciousness on one side, can an intrusion from unconsciousness on another side be reduced? Actually, preconsciousness starts to work toward that reduction. Preconsciousness can hold memory; that is, preconsciousness is a "memory strage." When preconsciousness has a memory of something, consciousness can predict a sudden situation related to stored memory with the help of preconsciousness. However, it is possible for consciousness to perform this action only to input from one side. Input from another side relentlessly intrudes consciousness, even if consciousness is unguarded. It can be said that input from unconsciousness is a kind of derangement for consciousness. Any stimulus is displeasing and can turn into stress. In contrast, when preconsciousness with the above function presents, preconsciousness can give consciousness room to think: this may be the input information at that time. When something stands by consciousness even from only one side, an intrusion into consciousness from another side can be considerably reduced.
Do animals and human beings have similar experiences? The case of human beings could not be compared with that of animals. In general, in terms of animals, their state of memory may not be as good as it completely rebuffs the intruding input information. Therefore, input information from unconsciousness easily reaches consciousness. This dynamic is expressed through the following emotional factors. The (undifferentiated) displeasing factor suddenly intrudes consciousness from unconsciousness, unconcerned with preconsciousness, consciousness is frightened and falls into a panic state; "anxiety is a kind of dissociation." In poor preconsciousness, to somewhat reduce the intrusion from unconsciousness on the opposite side, the self-defensive factor (derived from the reward system) supporting consciousness and the object-defensive factor (derived from the aversion system) almost incapable of prediction enter consciousness and oppose the (undifferentiated) displeasing factor. This is the psychodynamics in the displeasure-defense system. In contrast, with regard to human beings, because preconsciousness develops differently from the one in animals, it interferes with not only the self-defensive factor but also the object-defensive factor due to strong network and snatches the influence of intrusion into consciousness. This means that the displeasure-regulation system has high performance. When input information suddenly intrudes consciousness from unconsciousness, preconsciousness prepares various regulatory factors to restrain the displeasing factors. In other words, even if consciousness performs a detour process on the displeasure-defense system, the effect is limited. This indicates that there are few returns to the net formation in preconsciousness. When a detour process is performed on the displeasure-regulation system, the know-how to reatrain various displeasing factors is accumulated in preconsciousness (forming a minute network) and it becomes able to draw a new approach to the new intrusion of information. At that time, the very language is active.
In "new" topography, consciousness has an interaction with preconsciousness and unconsciousness, expressed as "preconsciousness ⇔ consciousness ⇔ unconsciousness." Here, I will introduce the dynamic phase, "preconsciousness ← consciousness → unconsciousness." If preconsciousness is not present and there is a dynamic phase, "unconsciousness ← consciousness → unconsciousness," any conscious experience is not memorized. There is no remembering, introspection, or learning. Then, the unpredictable mental state continues to input information into consciousness. If such a state continues in everyday life, consciousness repeats an incorrect understanding and judgement, and it becomes difficult for them to survive. If preconsciousness, which is the storehouse of memory, does not present, in other words, as soon as information goes out of consciousness to unconsciousness, all matters are forgotten. All are thoroughly forgotten and are never remembered. In psychoanalytic representation, this forgetting indicates defense and is distinguished from repression or denial (based on the matter to be forgotten). In contrast, when information goes out of consciousness into preconsciousness, this output of information is kept in preconsciousness and can support consciousness. This indicates the formation of a network. A concept is formed by a range of memories, and various representations are formed by a concept. Important representations are person representation and language representation. In other words, preconsciousness is a bearer of the emotional control system (which is constructed by person representations with various emotions) and, at the same time a bearer of the language system. Both systems are briefly explained below.
When person representations with various emotions are formed and consist of the emotional control system as emotional factors, personality, namely self, is formed. Even in animals, representations comparable to person representation present in "the displeasure-defense system." Asrepeatedly introduced, personality (self), which is present in animals, is a pathological personality (self) for humans and is not much diversified. (In the displeasure-defense system, emotional factors comparable to "self" are only "the ideal self" and "the punitive self"). However, from this viewpoint, it is clearly understood that consciousness is not "self as personality." Moreover, the structure of the mind where "self as personality" addresses consciousness is ready. Therefore, consciousness creates "self as personality," which is necessary for itself. In this respect, humans can create various personalities, especially healthy personalities. The reason for this is in language. The so-called linguistics is based on the history of cognitive linguistics as typology from F. Saussure via N. Chomsky. I am convinced that whole linguistics cannot be explained by this transition only. All linguists, except me (although I am not a linguist), may boast that the essence of language is "universality and diversity." However, I find the essence of language in emotion, namely, "pleasure and displeasure" and advocate "emotonal cognitive linguistics." (To avoid misunderstanding, I do not deny cognitive linguistics. I try to supplement this deficiency). Even if cognitive science is professed by paying attention only to the relationship between two systems, "the perception system ⇔ the thinking system," in a three-cornered relationship, "⇔ the perception system ⇔ the thinking system ⇔ the emotion system ⇔ ," consciousness and (essential) language are never generated. The emotion system is very important. Therefore, I suggest that cognitive language as typology should be combined with emotional cognitive language (emotional language, emotion-related language, and emotion-potential language). Although I may be reproved by linguists, I am convinved that the language system functions based on the emotional control system. The personality structure created by the emotional control system exhibits an understanding of language and expression of language at various levels that can distinguish normality from abnormality (healthy self from pathological self). For a strict distinction (because there is a limit to human effort), I am convinced that an artificial mind (AM) with "linguistic consciousness" should be created.
The Integration Theory of Psychoanalysis is the revolutionary theory of psychoanalysis. It defines mental health ＆ disease, and elucidates every psychological phenomena. Particularly, the cause of psychosis, schizophrenia ＆ manic-depressive disorders, is clarified and their radical
treatment aiming complete recovery is established. The contents beyond all imagination, the elucidation of consciousness ＆ self-consciousness, the way to enlightenment etc. are included in this book. Not only the expert in the field of psychoanalysis but also the persons who have interest in mind will be strongly affected by this book.
Digest version of the Integration Theory of Psychoanalysis